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Abstract—This research note II introduces a way to
understand a basic concept of the quantum enigma cipher.
The conventional cipher is designed by a mathematical
algorithm and its security is evaluated by the complexity of
the algorithm in security analysis and ability of computers.
This kind of cipher can be decrypted with probability one in
principle by the Brute force attack in which an eavesdropper
tries all the possible keys based on the correct ciphertext
and some known plaintext. A cipher with quantum effects
in physical layer may protect the system from the Brute
force attack by means of the quantum no cloning theorem
and randomizations based on quantum noise effect. The
randomizations for the ciphertext which is the output from
the mathematical encryption box is crucial to realize a
quantum enigma cipher. Especially, by randomizations, it
is necessary to make a substantial difference in accuracy
of ciphertext in eavesdropper’s observation and legitimate
user’s observation. The quantum illumination protocol can
make a difference in error performance of the legitimate’s
receiver and the eavesdropper’s receiver. This difference
is due to differences in ability of the legitimate’s receiver
with entanglement and the eavesdropper’s receiver without
entanglement. It is shown in this note that the quantum
illumination can be employed as an element of the most
simple quantum enigma cipher.
I. INTRODUCTION
The general network systems need to be protected from
interception by unauthorized parties. The most serious at-
tack is “ Cyber attack against Layer-1 (physical layer such
as optical communication line)”, because technologies
of coupler for tapping have been developed by several
institutes [1]. In addition, there are many optical monitor
ports for network maintenance. In fact physical layer of
high speed data link is a defenseless. To date, that protec-
tion has been provided by classical encryption systems.
However, such technologies cannot ensure the provable
security, and also the eavesdropper can obtain the correct
ciphertext:C of mathematical cipher for payload at Layer-
2, and she can store it in memory devices. Thus, we
cannot rule out the possibility that the cipher may be
decrypted by future technology.
The best way to protect high speed data is to physically
randomize signals as the ciphertext of the mathematical
encryption. This is called physical random cipher. The
most important feature of this physical random cipher is
that the eavesdropper cannot get the correct ciphertext
of mathematical encryption box, for example a stream
cipher by PRNG (pseudo random number generator),
from communication lines, while the legitimate user can
get it based on a knowledge of secret key of PRNG. Thus,
the ciphertext: Y B(C) as the signal of the legitimate
user and the ciphertext: Y E(C) as the signal of the
eavesdropper may be different as Y B(C) 6= Y E(C).
Along with this concept, Quantum Enigma Cipher
allows a secure high speed data transmission by means
of the quantum noise randomization by a mathematical
encryption box and signal modulation systems, or by
an integration of a mathematical encryption box and a
physical encryption box [2]. When we consider how to
realize such a system, we have to take into account the
following requirements on the encryption system in the
real world:
Requirement of specifications:
(1) Data-speed:1 Gbit/sec ∼ 100 Gbit/sec
(2) Distance: 1000 Km ∼ 10000 Km
(3) Encryption scheme: Symmetric Key Cipher
(4) Security: Provable security, Secure against Brute
force attack (exhaustive search trial for secret key) by
means of computer and also physical devices.
Recently, MIT groups claimed to be capable of their
quantum illumination scheme to provide ultra-broadband
secured communication [3,4]. The principle is that the
quantum illumination protocol can produce the difference
between Alice’s error performance and Eve’s error perfor-
mance. We can adopt such a scheme in quantum enigma
cipher as a physical randomization technique. The author
believes that this is the most appropriate application of
the quantum illumination. In the following sections, we
will discuss the reason and method to realize quantum
enigma cipher based on quantum illumination.
II. SECURITY OF SYMMETRIC KEY CIPHER
INCLUDING ONE TIME PAD
A. Model
Let us describe a standard symmetric key encryption.
A general symmetric key encryption Λ can be given by
Λ = ([PK ], Enc,Dec) (1)
where [PK ] is key generation algorithm and it provides
key sequence K ∈ K depending on the probability
PK , Enc is an encryption algorithm which generates
ciphertext C = Enc(K,M) where M is plaintext,
Dec is a decryption algorithm which produces plaintext
M = Dec(K,C).
B. Security criterion
When Λ cannot be decrypted by means of
computational resource, its security is evaluated by
“Guessing probability”[5,6].
(i) Ciphertext only attack on data:
PG(M) = max
M∈M
P (M |C) (2)
(ii) Ciphertext only attack on key:
PG(K) = max
K∈K
P (K|C) (3)
On the other hand, when some plaintext Mk and
ciphertext corresponding to them are known, it is called
known plaintext attack. It is easy to generalize the above
formula as follows:
(iii) Known plaintext attack on data:
PGk(M) = max
M∈M
P (M |C,Mk) (4)
(iv) Known plaintext attack on key:
PGk(K) = max
K∈K
P (K|C,Mk) (5)
These are sometimes called maximum “a posteriori prob-
ability” guessing. If one needs an average, then one can
define average guessing probability as follows:
P¯G(M) =
∑
C∈C
P (C) max
M∈M
P (M |C) (6)
C. Security of ideal one time pad
When the distribution PK is uniform, the one time pad
has the perfect secrecy such that
PG(M) = max
M∈M
P (M |C) = P (M) (7)
However, even if the system has the perfect secrecy, it
does not mean “secure” against known plaintext attack
on data when data is a language such as English. That
is,
⌈The perfect secrecy means secure against ciphertext
only attack, and it does not imply the security against
“known plaintext attack and falsification attack”.⌋
Thus, the term of “unconditional security” is misleading.
Let us show an example. The eavesdropper can get
the correct chiphertext of the length |K| bits, and she
can launch the Brute force attack. The decrypted data
sequences of the length |K| bits give all combination of
English alphabet (ASCII code) of length |K| bits. These
include a large number of correct English words such
as “orange, signal, cipher, and so on”. When the attack
is ciphertext only attack, she cannot decide which word
is the real plaintext. However, if she knows the first
alphabet “o” as the known plaintext attack, the correct
word may be “orange”. Thus, the guessing probability
may become very large value.
D. Security of one time pad forwarded by QKD
The quantum key distribution does not provide the per-
fectly uniform distribution for key sequence KG against
an eavesdropper. In fact, the average guessing probability
is given by Portman and Renner[7] as follows:
P¯G(KG) ≤
1
2|KG|
+ d (8)
where d is the trace distance in QKD protocol. Thus,
the one time pad forwarded by QKD is non ideal one
time pad which is encrypted by key sequence with non
uniform distribution. That is,
Λ = ([PK ] 6= ideal, Enc,Dec), PK 6=
1
2|KG|
(9)
If the value of the trace distance is very large in compar-
ison with 1
2|KG|
, the guessing probability is very large.
So such a one time pad may be decrypted easily[5,6].
In addition, QKD needs an initial secret key for the
authentification before the legitimate users start the QKD
protocol. This is the same situation as the conventional
symmetric cipher in which the key is for initial seed
key for PRNG. Thus, we cannot start cryptographic
action without certain initial secret key, except for the
conventional public key encryption.
III. DEFINITION AND SECURITY OF QUANTUM
ENIGMA CIPHER
A. Definition
Let us describe here the ideal quantum enigma cipher
system. The quantum enigma cipher consists of an in-
tegration of mathematical encryption box and physical
randomization for ciphertext of mathematical encryption
box [2]. The mathematical encryption box has a secret
key of the length |Ks| bits and PRNG for expansion of the
secret key. The physical encryption box has a mechanism
to create ciphertext as signal and it has a function to
induces an error when the eavesdropper receives the
ciphertext as signal. Consequently different ciphertext
sequences are observed in the legitimate’s receiver and
the eavesdropper’s receiver, respectively. A requirement
for the physical randomization is
Pe(Eve) >> Pe(Bob or Alice) (10)
This means that the error performance Pe of the eaves-
dropper becomes worse than that of the legitimate user,
when they observe the ciphertext as signal in communica-
tion lines. We can consider many schemes to realize the
above condition based on several quantum effects such
as quantum noise, entanglement. But the system has to
satisfy the conditions described in the introduction.
B. Security
The conventional symmetric key cipher produces the
ciphertext of length at most 2|Ks| bits. Because the key
length is |Ks| bits, when the eavesdropper gets the known
plaintext of the length |Ks| bits and ciphertext corre-
sponding to them, she can pindown the secret key by the
Brute force attack (trying 2|Ks| key candidates). That is,
the guessing probability is one. In addition, the sequence
of the ciphertext has certain correlation because of the
structure of PRNG. So the eavesdropper can investigate
several mathematical algorithms to estimate the secret
key.
In the ideal quantum enigma cipher, the eavesdropper’s
observation of the cipertext as signal in communication
lines suffers error completely, while the legitimate user
does not. So the legitimate user can decrypt by the secret
key, but the eavesdropper does not even if she gets the
secret key after her observation of ciphertext as signal.
Thus, the guessing probability is
PG(Ks) = 2
−|Ks| (11)
even if she collects the ciphertext of 2|Ks| bits. This
means an immunity against the Brute force attack by
computers. On the other hand, the quantum no cloning
theorem may protect a physical Brute force attack by
cloning whole quantum states, because a set of quantum
states for the quantum enigma cipher are designed by
non-orthogonal state with very close signal distance each
other.
IV. APPLICATION OF QUANTUM ILLUMINATION
It is not clear whether the quantum illumination proto-
col provides the ideal difference between the correctness
of the ciphertext or not:
ηideal =
PG(Eve)(Ks)
PG(Bob)(Ks)
= PG(Eve)(Ks) = 2
−|Ks| (12)
However, it may be one of the quantum methods to
create the different correctness of the ciphertext as signal
according to [3,4]. If it is so, the application of quantum
illumination is very easy.
(1) Alice generates entangled state, and sends the
signal mode to Bob.
(2) Bob prepares a mathematical encryption box to
encrypt the data sequence and modulates the received
light by means of BPSK, but the signal for the modulator
is the ciphertext from the mathematical encryption box.
(3) Bob employs the conventional optical amplifier to
mask the ciphertext signal by the spontaneous emission
noise from the amplifier. Then he returns optical signal
to Alice.
(4) Alice can recover the ciphertext signal from the
masking by noise by means of entanglement effect at
her receiver. But Eve’s receiver suffers the error because
she cannot use the entanglement.
So far, the quantum illumination protocol has been
proposed for a direct encryption to plaintext, and for
key generation [3,4]. However, this is not a good idea,
because it is difficult to guarantee its security. It should
be used as a physical randamoization technique. The
scheme introduced here is an example based on the most
simple cascade cipher of the mathematical encryption box
and the physical randomization. Even so, the structure of
security analysis is drastically changed. First we need an
optimaization as follows:
ηerror = max
ΛQI
Pe(Eve)
Pe(Alice)
(13)
where ΛQI is a set of quantum illumination with several
physical parameters. According to [4],
Pe(Eve) = exp(−4WκsGBN
2
S/RNB)/2 (14)
Pe(Alice) = exp(−Wκ
3
sGBNS/RNB)/2 (15)
Although we need complicated analysis to derive the
guessing probabiliy of the secret key of the mathematical
enryption box based on the above under the unconditional
setting, it may be expected to perform well.
V. FOR FUTURE
We have given an example of the concept of the
quantum enigma cipher by using quantum illumination
technique. In the sense of theoretical cryptology, such a
cascade cipher would not be attractive. The real quantum
enigma cipher requires the emergence of the additional
enhancement for the security or the function by integrat-
ing the mathematical encryption box and the physical
randomization such as the triple DES in the conventional
cipher. The quantum noise randomized stream cipher
α/η[8,9] and Y-00 [10,11] is a random cipher along
with this concept. However, the masking is very small
in the real setting, so they need additional randomization
methods [12] or a new technique. A key concept is how
to protect a secret key of the mathematical encryption
box by the law of quantum mechanics. The author is
expecting a good proposal.
VI. CONCLUSION
Quantum key distribution has only just one of the
functions of cryptology that provide secret key sequence
for realizing one time pad. As described in this note,
the one time pad is not a new concept in cryptology,
but quantum enigma cipher is indeed a new concept in
cryptology. It was claimed that the quantum illumination
may provide G bit/sec rate. But the direct encryption and
also the one time pad based on it are not an attractive
scheme for the real world. Thus it is preferable to adopt
as a physical randomization technique to the quantum
enigma cipher.
The purpose of this note is to introduce the concept
of the quantum enigma cipher using the quantum illumi-
nation. The author would like to emphasize that there
are many ways to realize quantum enigma cipher by
applying the quantum physics, but he does not know
how to establish the ideal system design to provide the
different performance from simple cascade effect. This
note may give a hint.
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